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A sharp rise in government debt in Korea has followed over years the 
Asian financial crisis.  This paper aims to assess the fiscal performance and 
test whether the current level of government debt is sustainable for a 
severely attacked country, namely, Korea.  Under the intertemporal budget 
constraint model, the study tests for fiscal sustainability and examines 
whether there was any discernible change in the behaviour of government 
debt following the crisis.  It applies the well-known test procedure by 
Hamilton and Flavin and Trehan and Walsh to the Korean case under study.  
In a different context, the study also applies the procedure of Campbell and 
Shiller to the tests of intertemporal budget balance.  Their method also 
allows us to assess whether there was any discernible change in the 
behavior of government debt following the crisis.  This task may not be 
accomplished with the use of unit roots or cointegration tests because there 
is only a short sample span since the crisis.  The situation is particularly 
acute for Korea in which only a yearly data are readily available.  Empirical 
analysis indicates that the levels of government debt are not sustainable in 
Korea.  It also shows that the crisis contributes significantly to push the 
government debt in excess of its sustainable level.  This draws a particular 
policy attention for fiscal consolidation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A sharp rise in public debt can lead to severe macroeconomic problems 
and can impede control of the fiscal deficit itself.  This is particularly 
relevant for developing countries where the need for public expenditure is 
high and where tax systems and public regulation and accountability are 
weak.  The recent experiences of the Asian financial crisis have renewed 
interest in the problem of public debt for Korea.  The total amount of 
government debt has risen sharply over the following several years in the 
wake of the financial crisis.  This is mainly as a result of huge and persistent 
fiscal stimulus to speed up the recovery process from the crisis.  For Korea, 
however, high public debt had more immediate consequences for economic 
performance such as debt crises and the resulting painful periods of 
economic adjustment. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the budget deficit and public debt 
problems of a severely attacked country, namely, Korea.  A key issue is 
whether the recent level of its public debt is sustainable. Fiscal sustainability 
is essentially an intertemporal question.  In this vein, several studies have 
devised and implemented tests of the intertemporal budget constraint: 
Hamilton and Flavin, 1976; Trehan and Walsh, 1991; Bohn, 1991 and 1998, 
Jha and Sharma 2004, to name a few.  These methods typically examine the 
presence of fiscal sustainability by testing the time-series properties of 
government debt and fiscal deficits implied by the present value model, such 
as unit roots or cointegration relationships.  Most of the subsequent studies 
have followed suit.  The study applies the well-known test procedure by 
Hamilton and Flavin and Trehan and Walsh to the Korean case under study. 
In a different context, Campbell and Shiller (1987) propose a method to 
assess the present value model of stock and bond prices.  The study also 
applies this procedure to the tests of intertemporal budget balance.  Their 
procedure makes full use of the model’s structure and derives testable 
hypotheses.  For example, one may test the restriction that the actual path of 
government debt is equal to the theoretical one implied by the present value 
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model at every horizon.  Presumably, the Campbell and Shiller model offers 
a more stringent test for fiscal sustainability than other methods mentioned 
above do.  Their method also allows us to assess whether there was any 
discernible change in the behavior of government debt following the Asian 
crisis.  This task may not be accomplished with the use of unit roots or 
cointegration tests because there is only a short sample span since the crisis.  
The situation is particularly acute for Korea in which only a yearly data are 
readily available. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an 
overview of the fiscal policy and budget structure in Korea under study.  
Section 3 explains the current fiscal stance for Korea in regard to budget 
deficit and public debt.  Section 4 assesses the fiscal performance in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.  Section 5 summarizes the general analytical 
background in relation to the present-value borrowing constraint and tests of 
sustainability and presents empirical results along with some policy 
implications for fiscal consolidation.  Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. FISCAL POLICY AND BUDGET STRUCTURE 
 
Fiscal policy played a supporting role in the Korean industrialization 
process by contributing to the overall savings rate and by minimizing tax 
disincentives of investment.  Though the focus of fiscal policy in Korea 
changed sharply over time, its major characteristics for the last four decades 
have included a relatively small public sector, comparatively low taxes, 
liberal use of tax incentives for saving and investment, heavy reliance on 
indirect tax, increased public savings, and relatively little emphasis on 
spending for redistributive social services.  Korean fiscal planners applied the 
logic of supply-side economics much earlier than their counterparts in the 
USA and the UK.  
Table 1 provides four indicators of the capacity of the government to 
influence the economy: share of the budgetary expenditures (general account) 
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Table 1 Fiscal Indicators, 1995-2006 
(unit: %) 
As a percentage of GDP 
 Budget 
Expenditure Total Tax 
Government 
Consumption 
Government 
Saving 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
- 
17.1 
11.6 
16.0 
14.9 
16.7 
14.8 
14.7 
13.0 
12.9 
13.8 
14.5 
15.1 
14.9 
15.9 
15.9 
16.2 
17.1 
17.8 
18.3 
6.2 
10.3 
8.6 
14.4 
14.9 
17.0 
16.1 
17.8 
18.1 
18.4 
18.0 
17.5 
17.8 
19.6 
19.7 
19.8 
20.4 
21.1 
21.3 
21.6 
8.8 
14.5 
9.3 
9.8 
11.2 
12.4 
11.2 
11.8 
11.2 
11.6 
11.6 
12.8 
12.3 
12.1 
12.9 
12.9 
13.3 
14.8 
15.1 
15.3 
–2.4 
–2.1 
1.7 
7.0 
3.2 
5.4 
6.1 
7.9 
9.1 
9.6 
9.9 
8.9 
9.1 
11.8 
11.0 
11.7 
11.6 
13.1 
13.4 
14.1 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Major Statistics of the Korean Economy, 2007. 
 
of the central government in GDP, the total tax burden, measured as a ratio of 
total (national and local) tax revenue to GDP, the government final 
consumption as a proportion of GDP, and the government saving rate.  
Despite the heavy and active involvement by the government in activities 
of the private sector, the size of government, whether measured as budgetary 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP or the overall tax burden, is still 
somewhat low compared with that of other countries, developed and 
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developing. 
The total budgetary spending of the central government has fluctuated 
widely since 1960, without showing any consistent trend.  The share of 
government final consumption in GDP has fluctuated less than that of 
general account budgetary expenditures in GDP.  Due to the concerted effort 
by the government to raise revenue, the share of total (national and local) tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP, or the tax burden, increased from 6.2% in 
1995 to 21.6% in 2006.  There has been an almost uninterrupted increase in 
government savings when the government sector moved from a position of 
net dissaver to one of net savers.  
Government expenditures have been basically restrained, with the ratio of 
the central government budget to GDP remaining at less than 24% 
throughout the 1960 to 2006 period.  
The central government budget for 1990 inclusive of the general account 
and the special accounts was 31.9 trillion won equivalent to 17.9% of GDP.  
Its ratio to GDP has been stable between 18% and 20% until the financial 
crisis in 1997.  However it hiked to 23.7% in 1998 and thereafter has 
consistently stayed over 21% (see table 2). 
While the size of the general account has varied by the equivalent path to 
the central government budget for the same time period, the ratio of the 22 
special accounts to GDP has been declining since the crisis after it reached its 
peak at 8.6% in 1999.  
An important characteristic of the central government expenditure pattern 
is that Korea had big share of defense expenditures and small share of social 
development expenditures until early 1990s and thereafter the share of 
defense expenditures has declined while the social expenditure share has 
increased.  In 1980 defense expenditures accounted for 35.6% of total 
government outlays and 6.3% of GDP.  The shares of defense expenditures in 
government outlays have continuously declined to 15.9% in 2006. Social 
development expenditures remained smaller than defense expenditures and 
economic development expenditure though the social development 
expenditure has increased gradually to 14.1% in 2006.  
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Table 2 Central Government Budget and Its Components 
(unit: hundred million won, %)  
Central Government General Account Special Accounts 
Year 
Amount Percent of GDP Amount
Percent 
of GDP Amount
Percent  
of GDP 
1970 9,897 35.8 4,462 16.1 5,435 19.7 
1975 33,289 32.1 15,869 15.3 17,420 16.8 
1980 152,808 39.4 64,667 16.7 88,141 22.7 
1985 278,398 33.1 125,323 14.9 153,075 18.2 
1990 319,115 17.9 274,637 16.0 44,478 1.9 
1995 729,150 19.3 514,981 13.6 214,169 5.7 
1996 927,052 20.0 584,808 13.9 252,244 6.1 
1997 924,642 20.4 639,621 14.1 285,021 6.3 
1998 1,054,505 23.7 732,260 16.4 322,245 7.3 
1999 1,145,482 23.7 732,260 15.1 413,222 8.6 
2000 1,239,155 21.4 805,099 13.9 434,056 7.5 
2001 1,374,808 22.1 986,685 15.8 388,123 6.3 
2002 1,452,499 21.2 1,089,183 15.9 363,316 5.3 
2003 1,586,479 22.0 1,172,229 16.2 414,250 5.8 
2004 1,831,944 24.3 1,182,362 16.1 649,582 8.2 
2005 1,923,998 24.7 1,342,076 17.4 581,922 7.3 
2006 2,008,786 25.1 1,448,360 18.1 560,426 7.0 
Note: Data prior to 1990 include both central and local government budget.  
Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance. 
 
There was a conspicuous change in the composition of the General 
Account expenditures in the aftermath of the financial crisis so as to 
stimulate the economy as well as to carry out restructuring policies; 
economic development (30.3%), education (16.6%), defense (19.3%), social 
development (9.8%) and transfers to local governments (9.6%) in 1998.  In 
2006, the composition is seen in a traditional manner besides more emphasis 
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Table 3 Composition of General Account Expenditures 
(unit: %)  
Year National Defense Education 
Social 
Development
Economic 
Development
General 
Administration
Grants to 
Local 
Gov’t
Repayment 
of Debt & 
Others 
Total 
1972 27.0 17.1 7.6 23.4 22.5 2.5 100.0 
1975 27.1 13.1 7.3 30.3 20.0 2.2 100.0 
1980 30.6 14.6 9.9 26.0 8.5 10.4 100.0 
1985 26.6 16.6 12.4 21.9 9.4 13.2 100.0 
1990 24.3 18.5 19.5 16.3 9.7 11.8 100.0 
1995 22.1 18.8 8.1 22.3 10.6 10.6 7.1 100.0 
1996 22.1 18.9 8.6 22.4 10.7 10.9 6.4 100.0 
1997 21.3 18.9 9.2 25.1 10.7 10.7 3.8 100.0 
1998 19.3 16.6 9.8 30.3 10.0 9.6 4.4 100.0 
1999 17.3 14.2 11.1 29.2 9.7 8.3 9.9 100.0 
2000 17.7 14.5 13.1 27.3 9.3 9.5 9.6 100.0 
2001 16.4 18.1 13.8 25.8 9.3 12.5 4.1 100.0 
2002 16.0 17.2 12.7 29.4 9.3 11.3 4.2 100.0 
2003 15.8 17.7 13.1 27.7 10.8 12.6 2.3 100.0 
2004 16.5 18.5 13.7 25.2 9.5 12.0 4.6 100.0 
2005 16.2 20.1 13.0 20.9 10.9 14.5 4.1 100.0 
2006 15.9 20.3 14.1 19.3 10.8 15.8 3.8 100.0 
Note: Data for 2006 are budget amounts and the rest, actual.  
Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance, Bank of Korea. 
 
on grants to local governments and education; economic development 
(19.3%), education (20.3%), defense (15.9%), social development (14.1%) 
and transfers to local governments (15.8%) (see table 3). 
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3. BUDGET DEFICIT AND PUBLIC DEBT 
 
3.1. Consolidated Fiscal Balance  
 
Korea recorded a consolidated budget deficit of 18.8 trillion won in 1998, 
the biggest annual shortfall since the Republic’s foundation in 1948, and 13 
trillion won in the following year.  Accordingly, the ratio of overall deficit 
inclusive of interest payments to gross domestic product (GDP) rose to 4.2% 
and 2.7%, respectively (see table 4).  However, the consolidated budget 
balance started to be positive ever since and peaked at 22.7 trillion won, 
3.3% in 2002.  This is over-stated due to the surpluses in the National 
Pension Fund (NPF).  To better assess the financial soundness of the 
government, it is desirable to exclude the NPF from the consolidated balance.  
There are two more factors to consider in addition to the NPF in this regard. 
One is the net lending and the other is the repayment of restructuring bonds 
by the government.1)  
Meanwhile, the government’s consolidated fiscal balance posted a surplus 
of 5.6 trillion won in 2004, down 26.3% from 7.6 trillion won a year ago, as 
it spent more to boost the economy.  The figure is equivalent to 0.7 
percentage point of the nation’s GDP, compared with 1.1% in 2003.  
The sharp fall reflects expansionary policies and the adoption of a 4.5 
trillion won supplementary budget.  Total revenue in the government’s 
consolidated budget reached 178.8 trillion won in 2004, up 7.8 trillion won 
from 2003, while total expenditures came to 173.2 trillion won, up 8.8 
trillion won from a year ago.  
The public fund, including pension funds and other social security funds, 
registered a 1.9 trillion won deficit in 2004, compared with a 2.8 trillion won 
loss a year earlier.  When the operation of social security-related funds is 
excluded, the consolidated fiscal balance swung into the red, with a deficit of 
3.6 trillion won.  The balance of social security funds posted a surplus of 
21.2 trillion won in 2004.  
                                            
1) See Koh (2005) for further discussion. 
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Table 4 Balance of the Central Government 
(unit: billion won, %)  
Balance of 
the Consolidated Budget Year Revenue Expenditure 
Amount Percent of GDP 
1980 7,281 8,455 –1,174 –3.1 
1981 9,247 11,358 –2,111 –4.4 
1982 10,074 12,296 –2,222 –4.1 
1983 11,596 12,546 –951 –1.5 
1984 13,040 13,963 –923 –1.3 
1985 14,505 15,218 –713 –0.9 
1986 15,856 15,921 –65 –0.1 
1987 18,882 18,622 260 0.2 
1988 23,101 21,458 1,643 1.2 
1989 26,187 26,206 –19 0.0 
1990 32,457 34,035 –1,578 –0.9 
1991 37,486 41,508 –4,022 –1.9 
1992 43,767 45,470 –1,703 –0.7 
1993 51,548 50,735 813 0.3 
1994 61,741 60,357 1,384 0.4 
1995 72,820 71,579 1,241 0.3 
1996 85,528 84,429 1,099 0.3 
1997 93,368 100,327 –6,959 –1.5 
1998 96,673 115,430 –18,757 –4.2 
1999 107,923 120,988 –13,065 –2.7 
2000 135,811 129,284 6,527 1.3 
2001 144,033 136,765 7,268 1.3 
2002 158,712 136,047 22,665 3.3 
2003 171,945 164,303 7,642 1.1 
2004 178,784 173,180 5,595 0.7 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance. 
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3.2. Snowballing Public Debt  
 
Persistently rising financial costs on the public funds used for financial 
sector restructuring in the aftermath of the crisis in 1997 were a main factor 
raising the budget deficit.  This dramatically raised the nation’s net 
government debt by 41.7% to 71.4 trillion won in 1998 from 50.4 trillion 
won in 1997.  
 
Table 5 Central Government Debt and Its Components 
(unit: million won, %)  
Net Government Debt Gross Government Debt 
Year 
Amount Percent of GDP Amount 
Percent of 
GDP 
1985 14,275,967 18.0 21,523,343 27.1 
1986 15,027,593 16.2 22,802,425 24.5 
1987 18,888,188 17.2 25,670,232 23.4 
1988 18,927,086 11.1 25,179,030 19.2 
1989 21,093,069 14.3 27,321,020 18.5 
1990 24,545,165 13.8 31,733,273 17.8 
1991 27,681,094 12.9 37,523,999 17.5 
1992 30,974,113 13.0 44,661,890 18.7 
1993 32,846,324 11.8 44,612,097 16.1 
1994 34,431,893 10.6 47,756,087 14.8 
1995 35,626,029 9.1 50,654,930 12.7 
1996 36,827,642 8.8 44,439,726 9.9 
1997 50,453,913 11.1 63,492,825 12.9 
1998 71,437,309 11.8 143,390,657 29.6 
1999 89,714,617 16.9 171,219,212 32.3 
2000 100,941,585 17.1 175,506,957 30.3 
2001 113,115,691 18.2 219,885,250 35.3 
2002 126,629,739 18.5 229,101,094 33.6 
2003 158,824,711 22.0 239,414,938 33.2 
Note: Net government debt is the difference between gross government debt and state-
guaranteed liabilities.  
Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance. 
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The surge was attributed to the issuance of a huge sum instate bonds and 
borrowings from international funding agencies in order to raise badly-
needed funds for corporate and financial restructuring.  When state-
guaranteed liabilities are included, the government debt snowballed by 
125.8% to 143.4 trillion won in 1998 from 63.5 trillion won in 1997. 
The skyrocketing amount of government debt is expected to pose a serious 
threat to the nation’s economic development.  Korea is worried that a 
dramatic rise in the government debt will derail the sound economic growth 
as has been seen in other countries, including the U.S., Britain, Germany and 
Japan. Korea’s debt ratio to the GDP is still lower than that of some 
advanced economies, most of which vary from 50% to 70%.  However, 
government debt, once it begins to accumulate, tends to surge continuously 
due to snowballing interest payment burdens (see table 5).  
 
 
4. FISCAL POLICY IN THE AFTERMATH  
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
4.1. Fiscal Response to the Financial Crisis  
 
4.1.1. Public Funding for Financial Restructuring  
Following the financial crisis in 1997 and in its aftermath, a number of big 
businesses collapsed in chain insolvencies as well as the undercapitalized 
banks, securities companies, and some financial institutions were thrust to the 
brink due to a shortage of liquidity.  This was attributed to interest rate hike 
and a credit crunch.  Hence the financial market became extremely unstable 
and even the financial system itself faced a risk of collapse.  
The Korean government proceeded to clean up the troublesome financial 
institutions by suspension of operation, purchase and assumption (P&A), 
mergers, etc.  It has injected 167.6 trillion won of public funds into financial 
institutions through capital subscriptions, purchase of bad loans and 
payments of deposits of failed financial institutions (see table 6).  The public 
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Table 6 Public Funds Injected for Financial Restructuring 
(unit: trillion won)  
Note: Figures are for the first five months of the year.  
Source: Korea Public Fund Oversight Committee.  
 
funds were mainly raised by issuing of Deposit Insurance Fund Bonds and 
Non-performing Assets Resolution Fund Bonds, whose repayment were 
guaranteed by the government.  The government also extended interest-free 
loans to the Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Assets Management 
Corporation for interest payments on the bonds.  The total outstanding stock 
of restructuring bonds stood at 102.1 trillion won (21% of 1998 GDP).  
 
4.1.2. Expanding Social Safety Nets  
A series of business bankruptcies and corporate restructuring resulted in a 
depression and a record high rate of unemployment rate.  Creating more 
temporary jobs thru public assistance and additional beneficiaries 
by extending the scope of social insurance helped coping with soaring 
economy and jobless workers.  
As a mandatory membership of unemployment compensation was 
extended to cover small business workers and self-employed were given 
Year Bond Issued 
Injection of 
Recovered 
Public Funds
Fiscal Funds Others Total 
1998 38.8 – 15.7 1.1 55.6 
1999 25.2 5.7 4.6 – 35.5 
2000 8.9 20.0 0.8 7.4 37.1 
2001 29.2 5.1 –0.2 –7.0 27.1 
2002 – 1.9 – 1.8 3.7 
2003 – 1.6 –0.5 1.0 2.1 
2004 – 4.0 –0.1 – 3.9 
  20051) – 2.6 –0.05 – 2.5 
Total 102.1 40.9 20.2 4.3 167.6 
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subsidies representing some part of the contributions to encourage them to 
join the National Pension Scheme, the number of beneficiaries of social 
insurance increased substantially.  For stabilizing the livelihood of low-
income families, the scale of benefit was increased and the range of 
beneficiaries was also extended.  
Accordingly, a budget increase by 32% per annum during 1998-2001 was 
followed for expanding social safety nets.  Fiscal subsidy for medical 
insurance covered almost 40% of loss incurred by regional health insurance 
authorities as well.  Along with strengthening the social safety nets, the 
health and social security budget was markedly stretched.  The share of the 
general account budget rose from 6.2% in 1997 to 10.8% in 2001 and its ratio 
to GDP hiked from 0.9% to 2.0% for the same period.  
 
4.1.3. Deficit Budget to Encounter the Crisis  
The economic recession since the outbreak of the financial crisis continued 
for 29 months while the average duration of previous recessions was 16.8 
months.  This painful and prolonged economic hard-landing in 1998 brought 
about budget deficit of 18.8 trillion won or 4.2% of the nominal GDP in the 
consolidated central government balance.  The magnitude of the deficit was 
not unusually large, but it was large enough to threaten the sustainability of 
the fiscal policy.  
The real GDP growth rate recorded 10.9% in 1999, a remarkable 17.6%p 
improvement from –6.7% in the previous year.  Such a sudden and abrupt 
recovery from recession is unprecedented one.  The economic recovery was 
spectacular indeed, but the overall adjustment process can be characterized as 
an adjustment at the cost of growth.  
Such a rapid economic recovery was obviously the basis for the 
consequent success in fiscal consolidation.  In 1999, the consolidated central 
government’s budget deficit reduced to 2.72% of the nominal GDP.  In the 
following year, the budget balance turned to a surplus of 1.3% of the nominal 
GDP.  Significant changes in the composition of both expenditure and 
revenue also supported the improvement in the budget balance. (Park, 2002) 
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4.2. Assessment of Fiscal Performance in the Aftermath of the Crisis  
 
Under IMF-supported programs, Korea did in fact allow public finances to 
exert a stimulating impact on its economy.  This has been true for Korea in 
1998.  This can be shown by the evolution of budget balances in Korea from 
the year immediately preceding the crisis to the year immediately following 
it.  
It is correct that the IMF advised Korea to limit the buildup of public debt 
in the aftermath of financial crisis in order to help restore confidence, and 
reduce the very high interest rates in such a situation.  Nonetheless, this 
advice was tailored to Korea’s special circumstances and the size of debt 
burden.  Of course, it is impossible to predict accurately the consequences of 
a crisis.  The budget deficits in Korea were allowed to grow rapidly in the 
face of deeper-than-expected economic downturns.  From all this, it is clear 
that government budgets in Korea’s situation have played a stabilizing role.  
It also needs to be taken into account the way that IMF-supported 
programs in Korea have been adjusted to respond to the needs of the most 
exposed segments of society, especially the poor.  In Korea, social safety nets 
have been expanded to provide unemployment compensation, targeted public 
subsidies and other support.  In several cases, government budgets also 
helped finance a needed restructuring of the financial sector.  At the same 
time, the programs allowed for significant shortfalls in budget revenues as 
tax proceeds declined with the recession.  
Fiscal restructuring also sought to reduce unproductive and wasteful public 
expenditures to help finance priority spending.  Many of the specific 
elements of government budgets thus provided support for the economy 
while a few elements were contractionary when seen in isolation.  Overall, 
the overall contribution of government budgets was supportive.  
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5. SUSTAINABILITY TEST OF PUBLIC DEBT 
 
5.1. Intertemporal Budget Constraints 
 
In this section, we set out a simple intertemporal budget relationship and 
derive the restrictions that must be satisfied for sustainability.  Consider the 
general budget identity  
 
1 1(1 ) ,t t t tB r B D− −= + +                    (1) 
 
where Bt is the real market value of outstanding government debt at period t, 
rt–1 is the real interest rate for debt instruments held from t–1 to t, and Dt is 
the primary fiscal deficit, excluding interest payments.  Under the assumption 
of a constant real interest rate (i.e. tr r=  for all t), solving equation (1) 
forward yields the intertemporal budget constraint 
 
1 1
1
0
[ ] [lim ],j jt t j t jjj
B E D E Bβ β∞ + +− + +→∞== − +∑                         (2) 
 
where 1/ (1 )rβ = +  is the discount factor.  From equation (2), sustainability 
requires that the present value of future primary surpluses must exceed the 
present value of primary deficits by a sufficient amount to cover the 
difference between the initial debt stock and the present value of the terminal 
debt stock. 
If the present value of the terminal debt stock is positive, equation (2) can 
be satisfied even if a government rolls over its debt in full every period by 
borrowing to cover both principal and interest payments.  However, Chalk 
and Hemming (2000) demonstrates that a government attempting to run a 
Ponzi game will find that no rational individual is willing to hold its liabilities, 
and it cannot therefore roll over its debt in full in every period.  Thus, no-Ponzi 
game restriction is typically regarded as synonymous with sustainability, 
which implies that the transversality condition, 11
0
[ ]jt t j
j
B E Dβ∞ +− +== − ∑  
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1[lim ],j t jjE Dβ + +→∞+  1lim 0,j t jBβ + + <  has to hold.  In fact this condition will 
hold as an equality since individual investors cannot end up being indebted to 
the government, and as a consequence sustainable fiscal policy has to satisfy 
the present-value borrowing constraint.  Thus, sustainability requires that an 
excess of future primary surpluses over primary deficits match the current 
stock of government debt in present value terms as in 
 
   11
0
[ ].jt t j
j
B E Dβ∞ +− +== − ∑                                         (3) 
 
As Trehan and Walsh (1991) have shown, equation (3) offers a simple test 
of intertemporal budget constraints in the vase where the (expected) rate of 
real interest is constant.  If tD  is a stationary stochastic process, budget 
balance is satisfied if and only if tB  is also stationary.  If tD  is nonstationary, 
tB  must be nonstationary and there must exit a linear combination of tD  and 
tB  that is stationary, i.e. cointegration.  Hamilton and Flavin (1986) is a 
special case as they find tD  to be stationary, and therefore argue that 
stationarity of tB  implies that budget balance holds.  With a few exceptions, 
most previous studies based their tests of sustainability on the tests of a unit 
root or a cointegrating relationship linking government deficits and the 
outstanding stock of debt (Trehan and Walsh, 1988; Hakkio and Rush, 1991; 
Bohn, 1998).  
Alternatively, the present value model of Campbell and Shiller (1987) can 
be employed to test the intertemporal budget constraint.  One benefit is that 
their model enables us to derive the optimal path implied by the present value 
model of public debt in an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) 
framework. To see this, consider a VAR model for tD  and tB  of the form  
 
1 1
1 2
( ) ( )
,
( ) ( )
t t t
t t t
D Da L b L
B Bc L d L
ε
ε
−
−
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                              (4) 
 
where the polynomials in the lag operators a(L), b(L), c(L), and d(L) are all 
of order p. equation (4) can be represented in companion form as 
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or in a more compact notation  
 
1 .t t tZ AZ ε−= +  
 
For all i, note that  
 
(  ) ,it i t tE Z I A Z+ =  
 
which is the forecast of t iZ +  conditional on the information at time t, ,tI  
containing current and lagged values of tD  and .tB   Projecting equation (3) 
onto the information set tI  gives  
 
1
[  ] (1/ (1 ) [  ].it t t i t
i
E B I r E D I
∞
+=
= − +∑                              (6) 
 
Using equation (5), the following set of restrictions on the VAR 
companion matrix A can be obtained  
 
1
(1/ (1 ) ,i i
i
g r h A
∞ −
=
′ ′= − +∑                                       (7) 
 
where g and h are column vectors of 2p elements, all of which are zero 
saving the p+1 element of g and the first element of h are unity (i.e. t tB g Z′=  
and t tD h Z′= ).  Since tB  and tD  are stationary variables, the right-hand-
side of (7) converges to 
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1[1 ] ,g h A Aϖ ϖ −′ ′= − −                                        (8) 
 
where 1/ (1 )rϖ = + .  Using equations (3) ad (7) with t tB g Z′=  and 
t tD h Z′= , it is possible to compute 
 
1
,i it t
i
B h A Zϖ∞
=
′= −∑%  or 1[1 ] ,t tB h A A Zϖ ϖ −′= − −%                    (9) 
 
which is a VAR forecast of the present value of future changes in tD  based 
on the estimated coefficients from the unrestricted VAR as in equation (4).   
This public debt variable, tB% , then reflects the optimal current deficit implied 
by the theory.  If the present-value model of public debts is adequate then tB  
should equal tB%  except for an innovation.  Because sustainable fiscal policy 
must satisfy the present value budget constraint, significant deviations of tB  
from tB%  may be regarded as evidence against fiscal sustainability.  
A formal test can be constructed to check the statistical validity of 
intertemporal budget constraints for the public debt.  To see this, post-
multiply both sides of equation (8) to yield 
 
[1 ] .g A h Aϖ ϖ′ ′− = −                                        (10) 
 
By writing out the restrictions on individual coefficients of the companion 
matrix, A, the restrictions implied by equation (9) state that 
1 1 (1 )t t tB D r B+ +− − +  should be unpredictable given lagged tB  and tD .  This 
orthogonality restriction can be statistically examined by running a linear 
regression of the form 
 
1 1, 2,
1 1
(1 ) ,
p p
t t t K t k K t k t
k k
B D r B B D vα δ δ− − −= =− − + = + + +∑ ∑             (11) 
 
and testing the null hypothesis 1, 2, 0K Kδ δ= = =L  for all 0.k >  
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5.2. Empirical Results 
 
Empirical analysis outlined above is undertaken using annual data over the 
period 1974 to 2006.  Data on public debt and deficit are in real terms 
deflated by the CPI.  All data were obtained from the Ministry of Planning 
and Finance and the Bank of Korea.  First, we test for the presence of a unit 
root in each series.  Table 7 reports the results of augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests for the null hypothesis of a unit root.  To have a crosscheck, the 
study also reports the results of Kwiatkowski et al. (KPSS, 1992) tests, which 
assumes the null hypothesis that the series is stationary with or without a 
trend.  Both tests suggest that budget deficits are stationary in Korea.  These 
results imply that from equation (3), the level of public debt in Korea must be 
stationary for fiscal sustainability.  
For public debt, however, the KPSS test shows that the null hypothesis of 
stationarity, either with or without trend, is rejected. These findings are 
consistent with those of the ADF test, as they could not reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root.  Consequently, the level of public debt may be 
regarded as unsustainable for Korea.  
The study now examines a present value model of public debt by applying 
the procedure of Campbell and Shiller (1987).  For this, equation (11) is 
estimated with p=2 to warrant no serial correlation in the residual series. 
 
Table 7 Unit Root Tests 
Debt Deficit 
KPSS KPSS 
ADF 
No Trend Trend 
ADF 
No Trend Trend 
–2.33 0.91* 0.23* –3.43* 0.07 0.06 
Note: Both ADF and KPSS tests assume the lag length of two which minimizes AIC (Akaike 
Information Criterion).  Critical values for the ADF and KPSS tests are drawn from 
Fuller (1976) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992), respectively.  An * indicates significance 
at the 5% level. 
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Table 8 Tests on the Present Value Model of Government Debt 
Wald Test 19.28 
p-value 0.01 
Note: The Wald test statistic is distributed as χ2 (4).   
 
Data on the real interest rate are constructed using nominal money market 
rates and the CPI from the Bank of Korea. Its simple average over the full 
sample is used to derive the dependent variable, 1(1 ) .t t tB D r B −− − +   Table 8 
reports the results of the Wald test for the null hypothesis that the restrictions 
implied by the present value model are coherent with the data.  This null 
hypothesis is rejected strongly with the marginal significance levels being 
less than 1%.  Accordingly, the level of public debt fails to satisfy the 
intertemporal budget constraint.  This may be regarded as evidence against 
the sustainability of public debt as sustainable fiscal policy must satisfy the 
present value budget constraint.  
Campbell and Shiller point out that equation (11) may be rejected because 
of economically unimportant deviations from the null hypothesis, such as 
data imperfections, which are nevertheless statistically important.  They also 
suggest a more intuitive and less econometrically stringent test that compares 
the predicted path of the optimal government debt under the theory with that 
of the actual public debt.  Figure 1 depicts actual and optimal public debt 
based on the estimation of VAR (2) model in equation (4).  There are 
significant differences between the two, confirming the rejection of 
intertemporal budget constraints as in table 8.  
In fact, figure 1 leads us to draw several interesting conclusions.  Actual 
public debt of Korea was smaller than the sustainable level prior to the crisis.  
While the level of public debt was not in an optimal path, they should not 
have posed a major concern to the healthiness of the economy as a result.  
After the crisis, however, the situation reverses as a rapid surge in the fiscal 
deficit pushes public debt far above the level of sustainability.  Figure 1 
offers one explanation why the unit root test may fail to capture the debt 
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Figure 1 Sustainable Level of Public Debt 
 
problem after the crisis.  This also corroborates the usefulness of Campbell 
and Shiller’s method for the test of fiscal sustainability.  Reflecting partly on 
this, the sustainable level fell subsequently to observe the intertemporal 
budget balance.  
Previously, Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003) examined the fiscal 
sustainability using the IFS algorithm for 12 countries including Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand.  They found that their IFS indicators for three Asian 
countries switched from the sustainable to the unsustainable region in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.  This finding is well consistent with the 
study, as figure 1 shows.  Skyrocketing fiscal deficit since the crisis should 
have pushed public debt far above the levels of sustainability.  For Korea, 
however, Kim (2001) and Bank of Korea (2002) report that fiscal 
unsustainability may not be a concern despite the jump in public debt ratio 
since the crisis.  Underlying idea is that given low initial level of Korea’s 
debt ratio, this ratio was still “outside the danger zone”.  These studies used 
data up to either 1999 or 2000.  Continued accumulation of fiscal deficits 
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throughout the early 2000’s acts to overshadow this somewhat optimistic 
view (see figure 1).  It will be prudent to wait for more observations before 
we decide with some certainty whether the current fiscal stance is sustainable 
or not.  Nevertheless, given the results in figure 1 together with those from 
Croce and Juan-Ramón, it is our opinion that it may not be a good practice to 
ignore debt growth until it causes a real problem. 
Fiscal expansion has been used in Korea to get out of two recessions — 
one occasioned by the East Asian crisis and the second by the downturn in 
the global economy since late 2000.  However, during this process Korea has 
accumulated the level of public debt that appears unsustainable, risking 
sustained high rates of economic growth.  If left unchecked this excessive 
accumulation of public debt might risk adverse expectations and subsequent 
recession just as the accumulation of excessive private debt triggered the 
crisis.  It is necessary, therefore, to ensure that Korea uses its current 
economic expansion to initiate tax reform to substantially raise government 
revenues and streamline and cut wasteful government expenditures to reduce 
fiscal deficits or, at least, generate primary surplus.  At the same time a 
carefully tailored program of privatization of government enterprises with the 
revenue being used to directly reduce the debt should be pursued.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
For Korea, the total amount of government debt has risen sharply over the 
following several years in the wake of the financial crisis.  This raises 
concern about the sustainability of public debt and fiscal consolidation.  This 
paper has set out to assess fiscal sustainability for a severely attacked country, 
namely, Korea.  At work is the model of intertemporal budget balance.  The 
study tests for implied intertemporal balance conditions for fiscal 
sustainability.  It also examines whether there was any discernible change in 
the behaviour of public debt following the crisis.  
Empirical analysis indicates that the level of public debt is not sustainable 
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in Korea.  It posed little concern on the soundness of public debt prior to the 
crisis.  After the crisis, however, a rapid surge in fiscal deficit pushes public 
debt far above the level of sustainability.  The results suggest that policy 
makers need to draw their attention to consolidate the fiscal stance and to 
retain the sustainability of public debt.  
Some caveats are in order before concluding the paper.  First, the present 
value balance approach has limitations in serving an indicator to gauge fiscal 
sustainability.  Some fiscal policies that appear unsustainable can satisfy 
implied constraints, while other policies appear sustainable but do not satisfy 
them.  Several alternative measures for the sustainability have been 
developed, but they also have their own shortcomings such as lack of 
economic grounds.  Second, the study has used annual date over the sample 
period 1974 to 2006 because quarterly data and a longer sample span were 
not available.  Such a small sample may be unavoidable for this kind of 
studies.  Nevertheless, the well-known problems in use of small samples (i.e. 
small sample biases, size and power distortions in unit root tests) are likely to 
undermine the strength of the findings in the paper.  Finally, the study could 
not address a possibility of structural breaks in connection to the Asian 
financial crisis.  This topic would be interesting, but has to be left until more 
observations after the crisis are available. 
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